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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SITAMIPA ULISIS TOKI,

Case No. 200903 83-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The jury convicted Appellant, Sitamipa Toki, after being improperly informed that
he was charged with being a restricted person and involved in a gang that engaged in
criminal activity, used guns, and was dangerous. Moreover, the trial court failed to
ensure that Toki received a fair trial by refusing to question jurors after a loud and
disruptive brawl outside the courtroom. These errors, alone or together, undermined
confidence in the outcome, requiring a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE THE JUDGE'S IMPROPER
REFERENCES TO THE RESTRICTED PERSON CHARGE AND THE
PREJUDICIAL NATURE OF THE REPEATED REFERENCES TO
APPELLANT'S CHARGE OF BEING A RESTRICTED PERSON WAS
HARMFUL.
The State does not contest the merits of Appellant's claim that the trial court's
repeated reference to Toki being charged as a restricted person was error. See Appellee's

Br. at 18-25. The State's decision not to contest the merits of Appellant's claim that the
trial court erred in repeatedly conveying this information to the jury is consistent with
Utah case law recognizing that informing a jury that a defendant is charged as a restricted
person is unduly prejudicial. See Appellant's Opening Br. at 16-21; State v. Saunders,
699 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Utah 1985), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 935
P.2d 484 (Utah 1997).
Rather than contest the merits, the State argues that the conviction should be
upheld because Appellant invited the error and also because the error was not prejudicial.
See Appellee's brief at 18-24. The State's argument fails, however, because Appellant
did not affirmatively represent to the trial court that he had no objection to conveying this
information to the jurors and instead moved to keep the prejudicial information from the
jury's review. In addition, the unduly prejudicial nature of this other crimes evidence
was harmful in this case where the witnesses who testified against Toki were intoxicated
and had a motive to fabricate the charges.
A. Appellant Did Not Invite the Error Where Counsel Did Not Affirmatively
Agree that Information that Toki Had Been Charged with Being a Restricted
Person be Conveyed to the Jury and Instead Objected to Such a Procedure
The doctrine of invited error precludes review of a trial court error in
circumstances where the defendant "engaged in a conscious and affirmative act that led
the trial court to commit the [ ] error. " State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 8, 86 P.3d
742. "[TJhe invited error doctrine is crafted to '"discourage [ ] parties from intentionally
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal,'" [and]
it is also intended to give the trial court the first opportunity to address the claim of
2

error." Id. at ^[12 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, H 54, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) (further citation omitted))).
Utah appellate courts have applied the doctrine only in circumstances where the
defendant "affirmatively endorsed" a trial court action by specifically indicating that the
trial court's approach was proper. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^| 11; State v. Winfield,
2006 UT 4, ^| 13, 128 P.3d 1171. In fact, the supreme court has limited the application of
the doctrine so as to allow appellate courts to decline to review an issue "when 'counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had
no objection to the [proceedings]." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, If 14 (quoting Hamilton, 2003
UT 22, \ 54). In other words, the doctrine applies only where a defendant leads the court
into committing an error by affirmatively indicating that the trial court's decision is
proper and not in circumstances such as this where Appellant and his co-defendant
objected to the procedure.
Cases where Utah appellate courts have used the doctrine of invited error to avoid
review involve circumstances where the defendant has affirmatively indicated that a
specific procedure is proper. For example, in the context of jury instructions, Utah
appellate courts have employed the doctrine of invited error where the defense counsel
"actively represented to the court that she had read the instruction and had no objection to
it," State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987), where counsel "failed to object to
an instruction when specifically queried by the court," Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 10
(citing Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1108-09), where the defendant submitted the incorrect
instruction, State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), where defense
3

counsel objected to the correct instruction, State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, ^ 55, 989
P.2d 1091, or where the defendant's proposed instruction contained the same error as the
instruction being challenged on appeal. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT16, ^ 12. In all of these
cases, defense counsel acted affirmatively in endorsing the specific instruction at issue,
thereby giving rise to the invited error doctrine when the defendant later complained of
the instruction on appeal.
By contrast, Utah appellate courts have not employed the invited error doctrine
and instead have reviewed errors regarding jury instructions "where counsel for the party
complaining on appeal merely remained silent at trial." Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023 (citing
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 1983); State v. Smith, 62 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1936)).
These cases demonstrate that silence on the part of counsel does not give rise to the
invited error doctrine; rather, the doctrine of invited error does not apply unless the
defendant has affirmatively endorsed the challenged action in the trial court.
Although the doctrine has been most often used in the context of jury instructions,
Utah appellate courts have likewise required an affirmative representation indicating to
the trial court that the specific action was appropriate in order to give rise to the doctrine
of invited error in other contexts. See, e.g., Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 13. For example, the
supreme court utilized the doctrine of invited error to decline to review a claim that "the
trial court committed reversible error by failing to fully probe seven of the eight jurors
who were ultimately empaneled" because defendant had "affirmatively represented to the
trial court that he had no objection to the jury panel." Id. Hence, by affirmatively
representing that the jury panel was properly comprised, Winfield gave up any appellate
4

claim that they were not.
The doctrine of invited error is based on "the principle that 'a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error.'" Winfield, 2006 UT 4, If 15 (quoting Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, \
9 (further citations omitted)). "By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this
principle by 'discouraging] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to
preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.'" Id. (further citations omitted). The
doctrine applies to "[a]ffirmative representations that a party has no objection to the
proceedings" because such affirmative representations regarding a specific action by the
trial court "reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further
consideration of the issues." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 16.
The doctrine of invited error does not apply in this case because Appellant did not
affirmatively represent that he had no objection to the trial court informing the jury that
he had been charged as a restricted person. In fact, Appellant represented just the
opposite - that he objected to the jury being made aware of this fact, and the State agreed
that the restricted person charge should be bifurcated from the other charges. R. 53;
222:6; 227:663-64. And, after the evidence was presented but before the jury was
instructed, the parties again told the judge that the restricted person language needed to
be removed, and the judge agreed. R. 227:663-64. Hence, this case does not involve
circumstances where the defendant affirmatively represented to the trial court that the
specific action challenged on appeal was proper; nor does it involve circumstances where
the defendant affirmatively led the court into making the error.
5

Despite the fact that Appellant made no affirmative representations that the trial
court's action in informing the jury that he had been charged as a restricted person was
proper, the State attempts to stretch the doctrine to include circumstances where a
defendant has challenged the trial court action below. Nothing in Utah case law supports
the State's expanded view of the invited error doctrine since this Court and the supreme
court have been clear that this doctrine applies only when a defendant makes affirmative
representations to the trial court that a specific action is proper. Expanding the doctrine
of invited error to include circumstances such as these is unwarranted and would not
serve the purposes of the rule since defense counsel did nothing here to encourage the
trial court to pass this information to the jury and instead on more than one occasion
informed the trial court of the impropriety of informing the jury that he had been charged
as a restricted person.
Nevertheless, the State argues that the doctrine of invited error precludes review
because Appellant passed the jury for cause and, after a discussion regarding the need for
removing the restricted person language, Appellant's counsel responded "that's fine"
when the judge indicated he would "take those a little bit later, but this -- this preliminary
set, I will read Instruction 1 through 18." Appellee's Br. at 22; R. 225:120. Neither of
these circumstances support application of the doctrine of invited error since the record
demonstrates that Appellant objected to this information being conveyed to the jury and
did not lead the trial court into committing the error.
Unlike Winfield, the fact that defense counsel passed the jury for cause does not
give rise to the doctrine of invited error. See Appellee's Br. at 21 (citing Winfield, 2006
6

UT 4, ^ 17). The defendant in Winfield argued on appeal that the trial court erred in
failing to adequately question the jurors so as to ensure him a fair and unbiased jury. See
2006 UT 4, If 13. The supreme court concluded that by passing the jury for cause,
Winfield had affirmatively represented that the jury was not biased, and therefore could
not argue otherwise on appeal. Id. atfflf16-17. Because this affirmative representation
precluded the trial court from probing further into juror biases and reassured the trial
court that it could proceed without further questioning, application of the invited error
doctrine was appropriate in those circumstances.
By contrast, application of the invited error doctrine based on passing the jury for
cause is not appropriate here because Toki had already made it clear to the judge that the
information should not be conveyed to the jury. Moreover, the error here was
exacerbated by the repeated references and the fact that the information appeared again
after the jury was seated, including in the final instructions to the jury. Accordingly, the
fact that defense counsel passed the jury for cause does not give rise to the invited error
doctrine.
The State also attempts to erect the invited error bar by arguing that defense
counsel indicted that he had no objection to the flawed preliminary Instruction number 5.
See Appellee's Br. at 22. But a review of the record shows that in the context of
proceeding, counsel's statement "that's fine" was based on an understanding that the trial
court would remove the offensive language from preliminary instruction number 5. R.
225:118-20. In fact, the prosecutor had already asked that the offensive language be
removed from preliminary Instruction 5 and the judge had agreed, thanking the
7

prosecutor "for the catch." R. 225:119. When defense counsel subsequently responded
"that's fine" when the judge said he would "read Instruction 1 through 18" he did so with
the understanding that the court had been alerted to the offensive language and would
remove it. R. 222:120. Requiring defense counsel to again object when the prosecutor
had brought the matter up and the court had agreed to remedy the problem is unnecessary
and would serve no purpose under the invited error doctrine. Indeed, defense counsel did
not lead the judge into making the error because the judge had been informed that the
information should not go to the jury, and defense counsel believed the problem would be
corrected based on the parties' discussion and the judge's ruling.
The State also attempts to erect a barrier to review by arguing that counsel for
Appellant's co-defendant rather than counsel for Appellant asked that the restricted
person language be removed from the final instructions. See Appellee's Br. at 22-23
n. 10. But what the State ignores is that the judge agreed to remove the language, making
it unnecessary for Appellant to make any further objections. R. 227:663-64.
Additionally, even if co-counsel made the objection, counsel for Appellant necessarily
adopted it since the offensive language pertained to Toki, not his co-defendant.
Moreover, in the context of the transcript, it appears that counsel for Appellant, not
counsel for his co-defendant, alerted the trial court to the offensive language. The
transcript reads as follows:
Ms. Buchi [counsel for co-defendant]:
Kamoto]

And your Honor, I would - 1 think
we need to take out the by a restricted
person language there.

The court:

Okay.
8

Ms. Buchi:

So that would be possession of a firearm.

The court:

Are we okay on this? Mr. [Kamoto]?

Ms. Buchi:

Uh huh (affirmative). Yes.

The court:

We'll make that change and we'll get it
submitted and get you copies.

R. 227:663-64.
Read in context, it appears that Mr. Berceau, counsel for Appellant, actually made
the objection and the court then asked co-defendant Kamoto's counsel whether the
change was acceptable. Indeed, it would make no sense for the judge to ask counsel for
Kamoto whether the change was okay if she had just made the request that the language
be removed. In context, and in light of the fact that the restricted person language
pertained only to Appellant, the record demonstrates that that Appellant made it clear to
the court that the language should be removed. In any event, regardless of which
defendant made the objection, the record shows that the judge was alerted to the problem
and agreed to fix it, thereby precluding an invited error bar to review of this issue.
The invited error doctrine does not apply in these circumstances where the trial
court was alerted more than once to the need to keep this information from the jury. As
outlined in Appellant's opening brief, this issue was preserved by Appellant's motion to
sever the restricted person charge (R. 53), the subsequent request that the offensive
information be removed (R. 227:663-64) and the judge's agreement at both junctures to
keep this information from the jury. The record does not support the State's argument
that Toki somehow acted affirmatively to lead the trial court into error and instead shows
9

that defense counsel made more than one attempt to keep the judge from passing this
information on to the jury. Neither the doctrine nor the rationale for employing the
doctrine applies in this case, and the State's attempts to preclude review under the invited
error doctrine should therefore be rejected.
B. Informing the Jury that Appellant was Charged as Being a Restricted Person
was Prejudicial.
Without acknowledging the supreme court decision in Saunders, 699 P.2d 738,
or the overwhelming prejudice caused by other crimes evidence, the State argues that the
error in repeatedly informing the jury that Toki had been charged as a restricted person
was harmless simply because appellate courts assume that juries follow the law. See
Appellee's Br. at 23-25. That argument fails because of the prejudicial nature of the
information conveyed to the jury, the fact that this type of error is presumed prejudicial
and cautionary instructions following an error of this nature are therefore different from
elements instructions, and the fact that the State's case was weak because the witnesses
were extremely intoxicated and had a motive to lie. As set forth in Appellant's opening
brief, the convictions in this case must be reversed, just as they were in Saunders,
because the error was prejudicial.
The supreme court recognized in Saunders that evidence that a defendant was a
restricted person creates "the tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because of
bad character rather than because he is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged." Id. at
741. "Because of this tendency, such evidence is presumed prejudicial. . .." Id. Neither
of the cases relied upon by the State in support of its argument that this Court should
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uphold the conviction based on a presumption that the jury followed the cautionary
instruction involved circumstances such as these where the jury was informed of unduly
prejudicial information regarding the defendant's restricted person status. See Appellee's
Br. at 24.
Since the information that Toki was charged with being a restricted person is
presumed prejudicial, this case presents an entirely different situation than State v.
Johnson, where this Court was willing to "presume the jury followed [the elements]
instruction" in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 2009 UT App 382, ^f 42, 224 P.3d
720. Such a presumption is reasonable when focusing on an instruction outlining the
elements the jury must find. By contrast, as the supreme court recognized in Saunders, a
presumption of prejudice arises when the jury is informed of this type of information;
presuming the jury would disregard the information is inconsistent with this presumption
of prejudice and would allow convictions to be upheld whenever the jury received a
cautionary instruction despite the presumption of prejudice and a paucity of evidence.
This Court's decision in State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
likewise does not require that the conviction be upheld based solely on a presumption that
the jury followed the cautionary instruction. See Appellee's Br. at 24. Burk involved
testimony from a witness that "she knew [the defendant] was responsible;" the jury could
easily have discounted this testimony as it decided whether the defendant was in fact the
person who committed the crime. Id. at 883. This Court concluded that this was not the
type of evidence that "had the tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by improper
means. . . " and was therefore willing to assume the jury followed the cautionary
11

instruction. Id. (citation omitted).
In contrast to Burk and Johnson, the information that Toki was charged with being
a restricted person is the type of information that can unfairly influence the outcome in a
case. See Saunders, 699 P.2d &\1A\. This Court recognized in Burk that:
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial:
if it has a tendency to influence the outcome of the trial by improper means, or if it
appeals to the jury's sympathies, or arouses its sense of horror, provokes its
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its decision on something
other than the established propositions of the case.
Burk, 839 P.2d at 883 (citation omitted). Unlike Burk where the witness' testimony that
she knew the defendant "had 'done this'" was not unfairly prejudicial, the information in
this case that Toki had been charged with being a restricted person fits squarely within
this definition of unfairly prejudicial evidence, as recognized in Saunders. While
cautionary instructions can cure some errors, there are circumstances where the prejudice
is so great that "no amount of voir dire and cautionary instructions can remedy the
defect." United States v. Mannie, 509 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2007). Those include
circumstances such as this where "an episode is deemed inherently prejudicial [since] 'an
unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
Although the jury's note shows that the jury focused on the restricted person
language (R. 107A), the State argues that "[t]he note demonstrates that the jury initially
did not consider the question of Defendant's restricted status because it felt it lacked
sufficient information." Appellee's Br. at 24. On the contrary, the record shows that the
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jury focused on the restricted person language and directly tied it to Toki and the firearm
charge. R. 107A. Under these circumstances, it cannot be presumed that the jury simply
ignored the prejudicial language.
The nature of the evidence in conjunction with the prejudicial information
underscores the harm caused by this error. Mele and her family members had all been
drinking heavily. R. 225:156; 226:242, 299, 303, 336. They also had a reason to
fabricate testimony since they were angry about Mele and Appellant having sex. R.
226:304-05, 322-23. In fact, Mele lied to police officers and her Aunt Myla, saying
Appellant had raped her because she thought it would make things easier with her family.
R. 226:389-90. Mele's lies emphasize the family's anger and motive to lie about the
details of the crime so as to implicate Appellant, and demonstrate that the evidence
against Appellant was far from conclusive. Moreover, even the State recognizes that it
had "credibility concerns caused by Mele's drinking that night." Appellee's Br. at 37. In
this context, information that Toki had been charged as a restricted person had the
tendency to influence the outcome, making the jury more likely to convict for possession
and discharging a firearm even though the family members were not compelling
witnesses. Under these circumstances, the error was harmful.
Regardless of whether this court considers the issue preserved by Appellant's
motion to sever and the trial court's agreement to remove the offensive language, or
reviews this error under the plain error doctrine, reversal is required. See Appellant's
Opening Br. at 23-24 (plain error discussion). The error was obvious in light of
established case law, the motion to sever, counsel's reminder that the language should be
13

removed, and the trial court's agreement to remove the language. It was prejudicial as set
forth above, requiring reversal.
POINT II. A SINGLE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT TO DETECT JUROR BIAS AND ASSURE A FAIR TRIAL
FOLLOWING A LUNCHTIME BRAWL OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM.
A cautionary instruction regarding the brawl outside the courtroom was not
sufficient to ensure that the outcome of this case was not prejudiced by that fight.
Instead, the trial court should have individually voir dired the jurors to ensure that they
were not prejudiced by the brawl. The State's arguments that a cautionary instruction
was sufficient because Appellant has not shown that the jurors viewed the brawl and also
that there was no prejudice because the State did not depict Appellant as a gang member
until later in the trial are not well taken. See Appellee's Br. at 25-32. Moreover, the fact
that the jurors found Toki not guilty of the aggravated assault charge and acquitted
Kamoto demonstrates the weakness of the State's case and underscores the role
prejudicial information such as this can play in affecting the outcome.
Although the trial court refused to individually voir dire the jurors after the
incident to determine whether the brawl impacted on their impartiality, the State now
argues that Appellant's arguments are speculative because he provides "no evidence that
any of the jurors saw or heard the altercation or knew anything more than was mentioned
in the court's instruction." Appellee's Br. at 26. The State's circular reasoning ignores
the fact that the point of questioning the jurors was to determine what they saw and how
it impacted on their fairness. By refusing to question them, the trial court removed this
information from the court's assessment.
14

Moreover, the record shows that a brawl took place outside the courtroom during a
recess. R. 226:373. The prosecutor below acknowledged that some of the jurors were
coming out of the bathroom "and may have been aware that there was something going
on." R. 226:374. The fight was loud and jurors would have heard it. R. 226:374-75.
Someone called Mele's name, there was a crash and sounds of hitting, yelling and
screaming. R. 226:375. Under these circumstances, it is not speculative to claim that the
jurors saw or heard the altercation.
In addition to the actual occurrence, the brawl was the talk of the courthouse
during the lunch break. R. 226:376. Defense counsel heard people in the cafeteria
discussing the brawl "in Skanchy's courtroom." R. 226:376. Since Judge Skanchy was
overseeing the trial, jurors who heard this would have been alerted to the fight even if
they had not seen or heard the brawl. Defense counsel thought some of the jurors were in
the cafeteria but did not know whether they had heard this discussion. R. 226:377.
Under these circumstances, there is no question that a loud brawl occurred outside the
courtroom, no question that jurors were nearby when it occurred, and no question that the
matter was subsequently discussed in the cafeteria when jurors might have been present.
Questioning the jurors was necessary in order to ensure that their impartiality was not
impacted by the event.
The prejudicial impact of not questioning the jurors is especially evident in this
case where the jury was improperly informed of the restricted person charge and the State
presented testimony regarding gangs and gang involvement by Appellant. Contrary to
the State's suggestion that evidence of gang involvement played little role in this case,
15

the State's evidence below coupled with this incident raised the improper specter of gang
involvement. Detective Merino's testimony and reference to gang involvement were
unnecessary to establish the in-concert enhancement, but nevertheless were presented and
aggravated the prejudice caused by this incident. See Appellee's Br. at 31.
As outlined in Appellant's opening brief and above, the State's evidence was weak
and the jury did not believe all of the testimony of the State's witnesses since it acquitted
Kamoto and refused to convict Appellant on the aggravated assault charge. Contrary to
the State's claim that this suggests that the jury was not prejudiced by the incident, these
acquittals demonstrate that the State's case was not solid and raise the question of
whether the jury would have disbelieved all of the witness' incriminating testimony
against Toki if it had not been aware of the restricted person charge, the brawl, and
Detective Merino's gang testimony. These acquittals work in favor of Appellant in
showing prejudice and demonstrate that in order to ensure fairness, the judge should have
individually voir dired the jury.

POINT in. TESTIMONY FROM A "GANG EXPERT" SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN ADMITTED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE
CHARGES AND WAS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL.
The State's argument that admission of Detective Merino's testimony does not
require a new trial disregards the fact that the testimony went well beyond evidence that
was even arguably relevant to an issue being decided by the jury and also disregards the
overwhelming prejudice of this type of testimony. Although Appellant maintains that the
evidence was irrelevant and unnecessary, even if portions of the testimony were helpful
in attempting to establish Kamoto's identity or that the three acted in concert, as argued
16

by the State, the extensive testimony regarding gang activities, T.C.G., the operations of
T.C.G. and the fact that gangs engage in criminal activity, was unnecessary and
irrelevant. Moreover, the State fails to discuss any of the cases cited in Appellant's brief,
all of which support the proposition that this type of testimony is irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial. As set forth in Appellant's opening brief and this reply, admission of this
extensive, irrelevant, and overwhelmingly prejudicial evidence requires a new trial. See
Appellant's Opening Br. at 30-36.
In arguing that Detective Merino's testimony was relevant, the State focuses on
testimony regarding the blue bandanas and gang membership. See Appellee's Br. at 3738. While this testimony was not necessary or relevant, as outlined in Appellant's
opening brief, even if it were, Detective Merino's testimony went well beyond this
information. Detective Merino's testimony emphasized the danger and criminal activity
of street gangs and T.C.G. in particular, described gang clothing, tattoos, T.C.G.'s
propensity for criminal activities and the use of guns by T.C.G. members. R. 226:519,
523-31. The State does not argue that this evidence was relevant, and, in fact, it was not
relevant to the issues before the jury. Even if this Court were to embrace the State's
theory that the testimony regarding the use of blue bandanas was necessary to identify
Kamoto and show that the three were acting in concert, the State has not claimed that the
remaining highly prejudicial testimony was relevant.
Moreover, the testimony the State does defend was not relevant since it did
nothing to show that the trio was acting in-concert or to identify Kamoto as a participant.
The State acknowledges that its evidence put all three men at the scene and that Mele
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could identify them and saw them use guns. See Appellee's Br. at 37; R. 226:365-67.
Other witnesses saw "two other guys" wearing bandanas and holding guns as they
approached along the driveway. R. 225:166, 168. Under the current version of the inconcert enhancement statute, the State must prove only that "the defendant was aided or
encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the offense and was aware that he
was so aided or encouraged" and need not establish that the other persons participating in
the offense had the intent to commit the same crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1
(2008). Detective Merino's testimony was not relevant or necessary for this assessment,
in light of the other witness' testimony.
Additionally, even if some of the evidence had minimal probative value, the
testimony was unduly prejudicial. As the court recognized in People v. Cardenas, even
when evidence of gang membership is probative to the charges, it can be unduly
prejudicial because of the danger that the jury will improperly infer that the defendant
had a criminal predisposition. 647 P.2d 569, 572-73 (Cal. 1982). In this case, the
irrelevant testimony "created a substantial danger of undue prejudice" since "[tjhere was
a real danger" that the jury would improperly infer that Toki had a predisposition to be
involved in criminal activity and carry a gun. See id. Detective Merino's gang testimony
was prejudicial since it created a danger the jury would convict Toki regardless of
whether it believed the testimony of the State's intoxicated and biased witnesses. See
also People v. Maldonado, 922 N.E. 2d 1211, 1226-27 (111. App. Ct. 2010).
Rather than acknowledging the overwhelmingly prejudicial effect of this type of
evidence, the State relies on a single civil case in support of its claim that the evidence
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was not prejudicial. See Appellee's Br. at 39 (citing Woods v. Zeluffl 2007 UT App 84, ^
7,158 P.3d 552). But Woods adds nothing to the prejudice inquiry in this case since it
involves a civil medical malpractice case where the trial court improperly excluded the
doctor's statements that he "missed something," "jumped the gun" and "shouldn't have
done the surgery." 2007 UT App 84,fflf3, 7.
The State also argues that the fact that the jury acquitted Kamoto and acquitted
Toki of the aggravated assault charge shows that the gang evidence was not prejudicial.
On the contrary, those acquittals show that the State's witnesses were not credible and
suggest that in the absence of the condemning gang evidence, the jury may well has
disbelieved any of the testimony. There is a substantial probability that despite
disbelieving the State's witnesses, the jury may have convicted Toki of discharging and
possessing a firearm because of detective Merino's irrelevant and prejudicial testimony
regarding the T.C.G. gang, its use of guns, and its involvement in criminal activity.
POINT IV. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS REQUIRES
A NEW TRIAL.
As set forth in Appellant's brief at 36-38, regardless of whether any of the errors
standing alone require reversal, the errors in this case worked together to cause
prejudice. These errors intertwined in a way that undermined the fairness of the trial, and
worked together so as to unfairly influence the jurors. Despite the fact that the State's
witnesses were extremely intoxicated and had a motive to lie, the jury convicted Toki.
The improper information about the restricted person charge combined with the irrelevant
and prejudicial gang evidence left the jury aware that Toki was charged with being
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unable to possess a gun and also that he was the member of a gang that used guns,
engaged in criminal activity, and was dangerous. The failure to question the jurors and
the possibility that at least some of the jurors witnessed the brawl further undermines
confidence in the outcome. In this case where the jury may have convicted Toki based
on the gang testimony, the restricted person charge, and brawl rather than the testimony
of witnesses, confidence in the outcome is undermined. The fact that the jurors rejected
the testimony of the State's witnesses further demonstrates that the cumulative effect of
the errors requires a new trial.
The State's claim that defendant's alibi defense was not strong does not change
this assessment. See Appellee's Br. at 42-43. The State was required to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of whether the jury believed Appellant's alibi
defense. Moreover, the alibi defense was sound. Defense counsel actually argued that
Myla, Camilla and Mele had all had some sort of romantic attachment to Toki, and Myla
and Camilla felt spurned. R. 227:629-31. He depicted the case as "family versus
[Toki]." R. 227:632. And he made no concessions that undermined Toki's defense. The
fact that the family set up Toki does not have the far reaching impact argued by the State
- in fact, the State has not proven that this case involved anything other than a set-up.
Accordingly, the cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant/Defendant Sitamipa Toki respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his convictions, vacate the judgment, and remand the case for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this V\_ day of September, 2010.
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